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BOOK REVIEWS
A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINAby James F. Dreher (South Carolina Bar Association, 1967. Pp.
97. $5.00, hardcover; $3.75, softcover).
When the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
South Carolina Bar Association decided to publish a handbook
on evidence law in South Carolina, it undertook a project of
great potential value to the bench and bar of the state. The
Committee also exercised good judgment in the selection of a
writer, Professor James F. Dreher, and in agreeing to his suggested approach to this demanding task.'
That approach, which greatly enhances the worth of this new
book, was to combine a brief and accurate restatement of present
evidence law in South Carolina with occasional editorial comment on what evidence law ought to be - for the latter, drawing
principally upon the two acknowledged giants among evidence
commentators, Professors Wigmore and McCormick.
Mr. Dreher's restatement of present law combines adequate
coverage with economy and clarity of style. A great deal of information is compressed into these scant 93 pages. True enough,
Mr. Dreher develops only the main principles, but he does that
accurately, and he provides references to the Wigmore and McCormick treatises for the qualifications and refinements. Thus,
the book should in itself answer most of the evidence questions
that arise in daily practice and should give judges and practitioners at least a start in researching finer points. Of course,
most of the leading cases on evidence decided by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina are cited, and many are discussed
briefly in the text.
Mr. Dreher has a facility for covering quite well in a surprisingly small number of pages topics that greatly perplex
many lawyers and judges. Two instances are sufficiently outstanding to merit special attention. On pages 29-33 the author
gives a good summary sketch of the impact of federal constitutional law on the admissibility of evidence in state criminal
trials. His exposition of what constitutes hearsay evidence, pages
59-63, is amazingly concise and extremely helpful.
1. See J. DnEHER, A GUIDE
(1967) (author's foreword).
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Obviously in such a short outline of a complex subject any reviewer can spot passages in which he thinks that brevity of expression might render the exposition misleading. In his discussion of impeachment on collateral matters Mr. Dreher states as
the standard test of what is collateral, whether the adversary
would have the right to prove it in support of his case "independently of the purpose to impeach." 2 That should read,
"independently of the purpose to impeach by showing the inconsistency." Some facts are not considered to be collateral even
though they can be shown only to impeach. Thus, another witness can be called to contradict a witness, not only on facts
relating to the substantive issues of the case, but also on facts
relating to "bias, interest, conviction of crime, and want of
capacity or opportunity for knowledge."
The only other passage which I feel is sufficiently misleading
to require notice deals with presumptions. Mr. Dreher says:
"The most valuable attribute of a rebuttable presumption (and
the only one we really know it possesses) is that it will take a
case to the jury if no evidence is offered against the presumed
fact." 4 In the parenthetical clause Mr. Dreher fails, even as
Professor McCormick's own treatise fails, to distinguish between
permissible inferences (or prima facie evidence) and true presumptions. If the basic facts of a true presumption are shown,
and if no evidence is offered against the presumed fact, it is
commonly accepted that this does more than get the case to the
jury; it gets the case "beyond" the jury and requires a peremptory instruction that the presumed facts must be taken as true.5
The second aspect of Mr. Dreher's approach in this book, as
indicated above, was to deal with the law of evidence as it ought
to be. It should be said here that Mr. Dreher found (as does this
reviewer) that the South Carolina Court has done a generally
good job with the rules of evidence. 6 But in three distinct ways
Mr. Dreher has been bold enough to advise the Court on ways
and means of making the good better.
First, he discusses several areas where ambiguous or seemingly
conflicting holdings give the court flexibility for the future, and
in these areas he points the way that has the approval of the
2. Id. at 15.

3. C. McComcx, THa LAw oF EvInENcE 101-02 (1954).
4. J. DRER, suPra note 1, at 86.
5. See STAsBURY, NORTH CAIWLIxA EVIDENCE §§ 215 &218 (2d ed. 1963).
6. J DREHER, supra note 1, at v (author's foreword).
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major commentators. A good example of this is the discussion
of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Mr. Dreher
there commends to the court an early strong case giving a liberal
construction to the common law rule and expresses the hope that7
a later, more restrictive holding will not have further influence.
Mr. Dreher also warns the court about potentially troublesome
interpretations of certain cases possibly affecting the competency
as witnesses of atheists and agnostics 8 and a case dealing with

the authenticity of telephone calls purporting to come from a
business office. 9
Second, Mlfr. Dreher traces the very sound gradual evolution
of several areas of evidence law in South Carolina and modestly
points out the next logical steps. For example, he traces the
court's gradually expanding acceptance of the opinions of highway patrolmen on the speed of vehicles, estimated from skid
marks and other physical evidence; and he suggests further
liberalizations that accord with advancing police science and
with the attitudes of courts in other states.' 0 The author also
gives the same treatment to the exception to the hearsay rule
governing testimony given at a former trial."
Third, Mr. Dreher does not shy away from flatly recommending change where South Carolina evidence law seems plainly
wrong. A prime example is his suggestion that the rule holding
that a litigant waives his objection to testimony by cross-examining on the subject should be changed.' 2 It is, indeed, unfair to
require a lawyer to forego all chance of carrying a point with
the jury in order to preserve the point for appeal. Mr. Dreher
also calls for changes in the Dead Man's Statute 3 and in the
rules governing the admissibility of a writing as a record of
past recollection.' 4 All of these suggestions are supportable and
seem to have been well considered.
Reviewing this book is my first concentrated introduction to
evidence law in South Carolina. With all respect, Mr. Dreher
might well have suggested perhaps two further changes. First,
the practice in many states of permitting an expert who has
7. Id. at 81-82.
8. Id. at 25.
9. Id. at 48.
10. Id. at 11-12.

11. Id. at 63-65.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 23-24.

14. Id. at 80.
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been present in the courtroom to state his opinion based upon
"the evidence you have heard given" seems a very sound practice,
since hypothetical presentation has many problems and the precise basis of the opinion may be explored at length on crossexamination. 5
Second, South Carolina has not enacted a statute creating a
privilege for communications between physician and patient.16
This is fine, since such statutes serve little or no useful purpose
and give plaintiffs in personal injury cases an unfair advantage.
On the other hand, it seems that the policy considerations which
justify South Carolina's priest-penitent privilege' 7 also suggest a need for a privilege for psychiatrist-patient communications. These relationships have efficacy only where communication is as uninhibited as possible.
South Carolina evidence law has far more good and progressive features than noticeably bad ones. For example, Mr. Dreher
discusses the statute which admits medical or scientific works
into evidence in certain types of cases. Mr. Dreher finds it hard
to believe the statute was literally intended and seems to suggest
a restrictive interpretation.' 8 Respectfully, I take sharp issue
here. The statute is a giant stride forward, as a learned treatise
exception to the hearsay rule is well justified in theory and practice. The "battle of the books" feature, which the author fears,
has not materialized in the one state which has had for many
years a common law rule admitting treatises. That state is Alabama, and my favorable attitude undoubtedly stems from my
experience with the rule when I practiced there some years ago. 19
Other features of South Carolina evidence, as reported by Mr.
Dreher, which strongly appeal to me are: the commendably discretionary approach to the rule in Queen Caroline's Case,20
governing the "laying of a foundation" to impeach a witness by
prior inconsistent statement;21 the rule whereby the credibility
of a witness who is a stranger in the community may be bolstered
in advance by character witnesses who know his reputation 22
15. See id. at 10 (author's discussion of restrictive South Carolina practice).
16. Id. at 28.

17. Id. at 29.
18. Id. at 85.
19. See Comment, Learned Treatises as Direct Evideince: The Alabama

Experience, 1967 DuxE L. J. 1169.
20. 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).

21. J. DiHER, suPra note 1, at 13-14.
22. Id. at 22.
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(Trial courts might well be given a discretion to permit such
advance bolstering of other classes of witnesses which juries
sometimes instinctively mistrust, such as Negroes, children,
prosecuting witnesses in assault cases, and the like.); and the
refusal of the South Carolina Court to adopt at least one of the
senseless restrictions on the use in evidence of dying declarations.28
Debunking department: Mr. Dreher has performed a splendid
service for lawyers and judges by exposing what he calls a
"folk-lore rule of evidence," the supposed principle that the
hearsay rule never excludes a statement that was made in the
presence of the party against whom it is offered. The author is
quite right in declaring that this rule "simply cannot be correct; ' ' 24 and, if it causes half as much trouble in the trial courts
of South Carolina as it does in those of Alabama and North
Carolina, Mr. Dreher's debunking of it is alone worth the price
of this little book.
A copy of A Guide to Evidence Law in South aroZimz will
most likely and most deservedly find its way to the desktop of
every trial lawyer and every judge in South Carolina.
PAUL HADIIN III

Professor of Law,
Duke University
President-Elect,
Wofford College

23. State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. L. 321 (S.C. 1859) ; see J. DpHMM, supra note
1, at 75-76.
24. J. DREu.R, supra note 1, at 71.
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